

THE ASHLAND UNION

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J. M. LANDIS & BRO.
Office—Opposite the Bank, Up-Stairs.

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If not paid within six months, 3.00
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THE ASHLAND UNION.

"THE UNION, IT MUST AND SHALL BE PRESERVED."

VOL. XX.

ASHLAND, OHIO, WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 23, 1865.

NO 11.

Rates of Advertising Advances

One square, one week.	\$ 1.00
Each subsequent insertion, less than three months.	.60
One square, three months, changeable at pleasure.	1.50
One square six months, changeable at pleasure.	2.50
Yearly advertisement three squares one year.	21.00
Yearly advertisement four squares one year.	25.00
Business cards, six lines or less, one year.	2.00
Administrators, Executors and Guardians Notices.	5.00
Probate Notices.	1.00
All Editorial and Local Notices, per line.	16

Advertisements Loaded, or inserted under the head of Special Notices, and Double Column advertisements, will be charged 50 per cent. in addition to the above.

Business Directory.

JUDICIAL OFFICERS.

GRANT W. CHAPMAN, Common Pleas Judge.
S. H. LANDIS, Probate Judge.
JOHN W. BAKER, C. C. Com. Pleas & Dist. C. C.
G. W. HILL, Prosecuting Attorney.

COUNTY OFFICERS.

ISAAC GATES, Auditor.
HENRY HENSHAW, Treasurer.
JOHN G. BROWN, Sheriff.
GEORGE W. UNIK, Recorder.
JOHN KEENE, Surveyor.
JOHN WOODBURN, Coroner.
JOHN BERRY, Commissioner.
JOHN VAN NEST, Commissioner.
HENRY WICKS, Commissioner.
JAMES McNAUL, Intermay Directors.
WM. CRAIG, Intermay Directors.
J. S. MARTIN, Intermay Directors.

SCHOOL EXAMINERS.

Rev. J. H. NORTON, Examiners.
Rev. JOHN ROBINSON, Examiners.
R. M. CAMPBELL, Examiners.

BANKERS.

J. O. JENNINGS, Cashier, H. LUTHER, P. T.
FIRST NATIONAL BANK
OF ASHLAND, OHIO.

HUBERT LUTHER, G. H. TOPPING,
JACOB CRALL, J. O. JENNINGS
JAMES PURDY, Directors.

Do exclusively banking business. Buy and sell Western Exchange and Coins; discount upon individual security.

PROFESSORS.

MILLER HOUSE.

OPPOSITE the Ashland House, Ashland, O.
At Miller's, Proprietor. Good accommodations and reasonable bills. Patronage solicited.

MULTY HOUSE.

WM. McCLUTY, Proprietor, South Side of Main Street, Ashland, Ohio.

AMERICAN HOUSE.

OPPOSITE the Town Hall, Ashland, Ohio.
Archibald Finley, Proprietor, is now prepared to accommodate all his old customers and as many new ones as may be pleased to give him a call.

LAWYERS.

JOHN D. JOYCE,
ATTORNEY AT LAW, Ashland, O. Particular attention paid to Collecting and business in Probate Court. Office on Church Street, between Main and Sandusky.

T. J. KENT, R. M. CAMPBELL,
KENNY & CAMPBELL,
ATTORNEYS AT LAW, Ashland, O. Office on Church Street, in the brick building immediately west of Chas's Store.

W. T. JOHNSON.

ATTORNEY AT LAW; Office over Wallack & Andrews' Shoe Store, Main Street, Ashland, Ohio. Also authorized by the Government to procure Pension Certificates and Collect Bounty and Back Pay.

J. H. JACOBSON.

ATTORNEY and Counselor at Law, Ashland, Ohio; Office in the brick building, over Singer's Hardware Store.

PHYSICIANS.

DR. F. L. CRANE,
OFFICE One Door West of Quire's Drug Store, Up-Stairs, Residence Corner of Centre and Washington Streets, Ashland, O.

DR. W. H. HILL, M. D.

PHYSICIAN & SURGEON, Ashland, Ohio: Particular attention will be paid to the treatment of the following special diseases: Dyspepsia, disease of the Liver, the Kidneys, Scrofula and Rheumatic Cancers.

J. P. CONLEY, M. D.

PHYSICIAN & SURGEON, Ashland, Ohio: Office over Singer's Hardware Store, opposite the Town Hall.

MISCELLANEOUS.

W. RALSTON,
JAMES H. RALSTON & SILVER SMITH, one door West of Potter's Drug Store, Ashland, Ohio—Gold and Silver Plating, and a choice variety of Jewelry kept constantly on hand. Highest quality of work and Silver Repairing done to order, on reasonable terms—Satisfactorily warranted.

H. W. MICKEL.

HAR & LARGES ASSORTMENT OF FURNITURE, consisting of Tables, Bureaus, Bedsteads, Chairs of every description, &c. &c. He keeps constantly on hand a lot of the latest styles of Cases and Chests. Having a new house he will attend promptly to furniture in any part of the country. Furniture made to order. Room one Door East of the Post Office, Up Stairs. (171850)

ATLANTIC HOTEL.

First West of the

AGG. W. DEPOT.

MANFIELD, OHIO.

G. C. TOWNLEY.

(Date of the North American).

PROFESSOR.

March 8, 1865-504

NOTICE is hereby given that the undersigned has been duly appointed and qualified Administrator of the Estate of Samuel H. Henshaw, deceased, late of Green Township, Ashland County, Ohio.

WILLIAM JOYCE,
July 10-3w6

A SHAP OF HISTORY.

Letter from Gen. Morgan on Gen. Halleck.

MOUNT VERNON, Ohio, June 6, 1863.

L. Thomas, Assistant General U. S. A.:

GENERAL—On the 6th of December, 1862, I wrote to you from Memphis (see Exhibit A), that the journals of that date announced that General Halleck, in his report of December 2, 1862, stated that "the alleged cause of the retreat from Cumberland Gap, was the want of supplies," but that the commanding officer had just before reported that he had "several weeks provisions," and "that he would not abandon that important post," and that "an investigation" had "been ordered."

As two months have elapsed since General Halleck had been informed of the evacuation, and as I had not been notified that an investigation had been ordered, so that I might have an opportunity of producing evidence of the facts upon which I acted; and as no information had been given of any dissatisfaction at Washington, as to my conduct, save an anonymous telegram, which was discredited by the country, by the army, and by myself; in the exercise of the right guaranteed to every officer, I demanded a prompt hearing before a Court of Inquiry or a Court Martial. To that demand on the 20th of December, 1862, General Halleck through Assistant Adjutant General Kelton, replied (Exhibit B) that Major General Wright was directed, some time since, to investigate and report the facts concerning that affair; and that "if that report should be satisfactory no further proceedings would be required, and that I would be held free from all blame."

You will observe, sir, that this assurance of General Halleck was made on the 20th of December, 1862, and that his report of general censure upon the operations of all our armies was made on the 2d of that month. My astonishment, therefore, was great, when, in reply to my letter of January 6th, 1863, General Wright, on the 27th of that month (Exhibit C), informed me that on the 15th of October, 1862, six weeks before General Halleck wrote his report, he General Wright made his investigation, and had written to General Halleck commending my policy in evacuating Cumberland Gap, and had stated that he "did not see how, with starvation staring him (Morgan) in the face, and with no certainty of relief being afforded, he could have come to any other conclusion than the one arrived at."

Gen. Wright further informed Gen. Halleck that "the evacuation was in pursuance of the unanimous opinion of the several officers of the command (Exhibit D, record of council of war); was a matter of necessity, arising from their provisions being exhausted, their communications cut off, and no information of any prospect of relief being received."

And yet, with this report of the investigation, made in accordance with his directions, and by the officer selected by himself, with this report lying before him, Gen. Halleck published to the world that he had ordered an investigation; but suppressed the fact that the investigation had been under six weeks before the publication of his report, and that my action had been fully sustained.

Although I have suffered public wrong, I feel too deep an interest in the great issue for national existence now being tried on the battlefield, to add a new disturbing element by making a public vindication. But I would be unworthy of the cause of defense of which I drew my sword, were I to allow any personal consideration to prevent me from placing on record a statement of facts, as set forth in this paper.

Having waited in vain for a further reply from Gen. Halleck, on the 18th of January, 1863 (Exhibit E), I wrote to you that "I had patiently remained under the public censure of Gen. Halleck for the period of four months, believing that time and investigation were only necessary to secure the approval of my course," and I requested to be informed "whether my conduct in the evacuation of Cumberland Gap met with the approval of the General-in-Chief." To that communication Gen. Halleck has not found it convenient to reply; but in his letter of Feb. 18th, 1863 (Exhibit F), in response to Gen. Wright's letter of Feb. 4th, 1863 (Exhibit G), Gen. Halleck says: "The facts as now presented, justified General Morgan's retreat."

What facts? Gen. Halleck possessed no facts on the 8th of February, 1863, which he did not know on the 2d of December, 1862, when he published his censure report.

In his letter of February 4th, 1863, General Wright simply re-affirmed the facts and opinion already stated by him, in his official report of the investigation, made October 15th, 1862. And in reply to General Wright's letter of Feb. 4th, 1863, Gen. Halleck says: "In his letter of Feb. 4th, you fully exonerated Gen. Morgan from all blame in abandoning Cumberland Gap. No further investigation will therefore be made." In substance, Gen. Wright's letter of Feb. 4, 1863, and his report of October 15, 1862, are identical, as Gen. Halleck admits. Upon what principle, then, did he publicly censure my course upon receiving the first letter, and privately justify my conduct on receiving the second, when both

sustained my action?

Gen. Halleck expressed "regret that Gen. Wright did not make a full and formal investigation at the time it was ordered." And yet, when Gen. Halleck penned the expression of that regret, he knew that the investigation was as full and formal as it could have been made, except by Court of Inquiry or Court Martial. He says that such an investigation "was due to General Morgan, as well as to Gen. Wright and the Government." If due to me, why did Gen. Halleck refuse to grant me a Court Martial or a Court of Inquiry? If due to the Government, why did not General Halleck procure an order for a Court of Inquiry; or himself order a Court Martial? Gen. Halleck ought to know that Gen. Wright had not the power to order a Court of Inquiry; he (Halleck) refused me a Court, and did not order one himself; but, on the contrary, he ordered the investigation to be made by a single officer—selected that officer himself, and at the late day he gradually and privately justified my conduct on the report of that officer.

Gen. Halleck further says: "Gen. Morgan represented his force as able to hold Cumberland Gap against any number of troops which the enemy could bring against him. He was almost boastful in his confidence that he could do this—On these assurances the Government believed that the post would be held by us, and serve as a serious obstacle to the retreat of Gen. Bragg's army."

General Halleck strangely confounds "force" with "substance." I did hold my position "against a force more than four times greater than my own," the enemy completely surrounded, but did not attack me. And had not Gen. Halleck failed to open communication between Lexington and Cumberland Gap, as he promised to do (Exhibit H), that stronghold would be ours to day.

I had sufficient force to beat the enemy if he attacked me, but had not subsistence sufficient to keep my troops two weeks longer from starvation.

In his report of Dec. 2d, 1862, General Halleck says that just before the evacuation, I reported that I had "several weeks' supplies;" but in his letter of February 8, 1863, he asserts that in a dispatch of Sept. 11th, 1862, alleged to have been written by me six days before the evacuation, I said that I had supplies for seventy or eighty days. But in that same letter General Halleck says: "It is true that he (Morgan) stated in his dispatch that his supplies were limited." How, then, does Gen. Halleck reconcile the assertion of seventy or eighty days supplies with his admission that I reported that my supplies were limited? He says that I so stated in my dispatch of September 11, 1862; but I deny having written such a dispatch to General Halleck, General Wright, or any other person. No such dispatch was ever written by or for me; and if any purporting to be such is in existence, I denounce it as a forgery.

In my official report to Gen. Wright, October 10, 1862 (Exhibit I), I said: "On the 9th of September last (Exhibit J), I addressed a letter to Maj. General Wright, by one of my aids-de-camp, with a verbal message that by eating mules we could hold out sixty days (Exhibit K); but on the 12th of September, the able and energetic division quartermaster informed me that it was impossible longer to feed the mules, and suggested that they should be sent to the Ohio river." I further stated that my troops had been six days without bread, and that De Courcy had failed to obtain the hoped-for supplies at Manchester. These facts were all before General Halleck while he was writing his report of December 2nd, 1862, for which he so ungraciously apologized in his letter to Gen. Wright of February, 8th, 1863.

General Halleck further says: "Had his (Morgan's) true condition been known, measures would have been taken to relieve him."

Does Gen. Halleck mean to say that he did not do all he was able to do at Big Hill, Richmond and Lexington? Does he admit that he did not cause Bragg and Smith to be driven from Kentucky at the earliest possible moment? If so, then it is certain that General Halleck is responsible for the loss of Cumberland Gap; for the enemy maintained his position in the heart of Kentucky, one hundred miles this side of Cumberland Ford, until more than two months after my troops had been starved out of Cumberland Gap.

However ill informed General Halleck may have been as to the general theatre of operations, I propose to prove that he had no excuse for being ignorant of the condition of my command. He had been duly notified that my division was surrounded on the barren summit of the Cumberland Mountains; that Stephen was in my immediate front with a force double my own; that Bragg was on my right flank with a vast army; that Kirby Smith had gained my rear with a force represented as being three times stronger than mine; and that Marshall occupied the sterile region to the North, between the Gap and the Ohio river. He had been further informed by my official report of the occupation of that strong hold, under date of June 22nd, 1862, that "While at Cumberland Ford I was compelled to haul forage (Exhibit L) a distance of ninety miles, and that during the months of April and May, when the roads were so bad that a train of ten wagons could only advance three

or four miles per day."

That on the 30th of June, 1862, I telegraphed to Lieut. Col. Swords, Assistant Quartermaster General—

"We are in want of everything. We are destitute of forage."

That on the 21st day of July, 1862, Chief Engineer Graighill, acting on my staff, telegraphed to Brigadier General Totten, at Washington City—

"The country in our rear is exhausted. 'That in our front soon will be.'"

That on the 23d of July, I telegraphed to the Secretary of War and to General Buell—

"My supplies are very short."

That on the 29th day of July, in my letter of instructions to Chief Engineer Craighill, about to proceed to General Halleck's headquarters (see Exhibit M), I stated that

"East Tennessee and Kentucky to the Blue Grass region are exhausted."

That on the 10th of August, I telegraphed to the Secretary of War and to General Buell—

"I have but three weeks' supplies."

"Kirby Smith cannot possibly remain three weeks in my immediate rear, while I can hold this place five weeks with my present command."

(I did hold the Gap four weeks and five days from the date of that dispatch.)

That on the 19th of August, I telegraphed General Halleck that "One hundred and fifty wagons loaded with forage and subsistence have arrived."

Those supplies were principally of forage, which had been hauled over one hundred miles, and as the teams had to be fed, while on the road, from the wagons, the amount was greatly reduced.

Here, then, is the proof that General Halleck was repeatedly informed of my true condition as to supplies, and that if he had the means to have given me relief, as he says "he might have done," he is beyond all doubt responsible for the loss of Cumberland Gap.

General Halleck says that "the Government believed that Cumberland Gap would form a serious obstacle to the retreat of the enemy."

If the Administration so believed, it was the duty of General Halleck to have corrected so erroneous an impression. He was aware that I had invaded East Tennessee in June, 1862, by two other gaps, and that Kirby Smith had invaded Kentucky by the same routes in August of that year. Hence, even had General Halleck furnished me with supplies, as he says he might have done, the forces of Smith and Bragg would have retreated by two or three roads, instead of by one.

In obedience to instructions from the Secretary of War, I kept him advised of my movements, and on the 11th day of May, and twice afterwards, I suggested the importance of protecting the lines of communication between Louisville and Nashville, and between Lexington and Cumberland Ford; and afterwards I strongly recommended the occupation of Rogers' and Big Creek gaps. But both lines were left unprotected; the cavalry I had repeatedly asked for was not furnished, and the natural result of the weakened and exposed condition of Kentucky, were the raids of John Morgan and the invasion of Smith and Bragg.

Regarding the occupation of East Tennessee as of vital importance, in vain I made every effort to have a rail or other good military road constructed to Cumberland Gap, and from thence to be extended to intersect the great road from Richmond which connects East Tennessee with Virginia, the Carolinas, Alabama and Mississippi.

Three times I earnestly requested to be allowed to advance against Knoxville, and pledged myself to sweep East Tennessee from Bristol to Chattanooga. I had supplies of arms for six additional regiments of East Tennesseans, and all communication with Virginia could have been cut off, until Buell could have advanced from the Southwest. But I was ordered not to assume the offensive.

Had not these plans been interfered with, the invasion of Kentucky would not have taken place, and East Tennessee and Cumberland Gap would be in our possession to-day.

Gen. Halleck complains that I was "almost boastful" in my "confidence that he (I) could hold his (my) position against any number of troops the enemy could bring against him (me)."

There was a stern necessity for a tone of confidence on my part; for I had reason to know that there was panic from Washington to Louisville. And although cut off from supply, without a single soldier wearing the Union uniform within two hundred miles of my post; threatened by a force vastly greater than my own, my command maintained "a boastful confidence," and sought to inspire at least a moderate degree elsewhere.

In answer to an official telegram, I replied:

"I am surprised to hear that there is consternation at Louisville, or elsewhere. Here (Cumberland Gap) all is quiet and orderly. We are prepared for the enemy whenever he may show himself."

The enemy did show himself, and the result proved that we were ready to receive him. During the thirty-two days that we were invested we captured over five hundred officers and soldiers, making an equivalent of five hundred and forty-two privates, and killed and wounded one hundred and seventy, making an aggregate loss of over seven hundred of the